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INTEREST  RATES IN THE  REAGAN  YEARS 
AZS  TRACT 
The Reagan  Administration  entered office in 1981  with one of the 
clearest and moat ambitious  agendas in recent times.  The new administration 
advanced five economic/budgetary  goals to rebuild America economically and 
militarily:  (1) reduce inflation,  (2) deregulate  the economy,  (3) cut 
taxes,  (4) increase  military spending  and (5) reduce  nondefense  spending 
sufficiently  to balance the budget.  Achieving, or not achieving,  these 
economic/budgetary  goals likely  had a significant  impact  on interest  rates. 
Six specific hypotheses  are  investigated  in this  paper. 
During the first Reagan  term,  the battle to lower inflation  acted to 
maintain the high real interest  rates  carried over from the Carter years 
and, while the increase in structural  deficits did not raise  real rates 
much,  the reduction in private saving  due to the unwinding of the second 
OPEC shock and an aggressive  foreign policy that  heightened fear  of nuclear 
war  raised  real interest  rates to levels  not seen since the late 1920s. 
Moreover, the increased  volatility  of interest  rates during this  protracted 
battle with inflation  raised  yields  on callable fixed-rate  mortgages  by over 
a percent'age  point relative to the already inflated  yields on noncallable 
Treasuries. 
By the end of Reagan's second  term,  inflation,  marginal tax rates, 
nuclear fear,  and interest  rate volatility  were all down.  As a result, 
nominal Treasury rates  have plunged (real  bill rates since 1986 are below 
their  average values for the previous  quarter century), and yields on 
callable securities  have receded to more normal levels  relative to 
noncallable  Treasuries.  Yields on tax-exempt  securities  are one and a 
quarter  percentage points  higher  relative to Treasuries  than in the pre- 
Reagan years, and yields on fixed-rate  mortgages  are up by a half percentage 
point.  These constitute  an intended  reduction  in the previous financial 
subsidies  to state and local  and household  capital formation,  respectively. 
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The Reagan  Administration  entered office  in 1981 with one of the 
clearest and most ambitious  agendas in recent  times.  The new administration 
advanced  five economic/budgetary  goals to rebuild  America economically  and 
militarily:  (1) reduce inflation,  (2) deregulate  the economy, (3) cut 
taxes,  (4) increase  military spending  and (5) reduce  nondefense spending 
sufficiently  to balance the budget.  Deregulation  and the military  buildup 
were begun under the Carter  Administration;  major commitments  to reduce 
inflation  and to cut taxes  and nondefense  spending  were new.1 
In its first term,  the Reagan  Administration  successfully achieved  the 
first  four goals.  However, while  nondefense  spending  was Cut, the reduction 
was insufficient  to offset the tax reductions,  leaving a substantial 
structural  deficit.  In its second  term,  some  progress was made toward 
reducing this deficit,  but the progress  was achieved largely by scaling  back 
defense,  not nondefense,  outlays.  In addition,  tax reform  was passed,  but 
this was a tax shift (household  taxes lowered,  business taxes raised),  not 
an overall  cut.  Nonetheless, both personal  and corporate  marginal tax rates 
were cut. 
Achieving,  or not achieving, these  economic/budgetary  goals likely  had 
a significant  impact  on interest  rates.  Six specific  hypotheses  are 
investigated  in this paper: a)  the cur in the inflation  rate  from 10 to 4 percent lowered  nominal 
interest rates  generally  by reducing the  inflation  premium in them, 
h)  the  increased  structural  deficits raised real interest  rates 
generally (Feldatein,  1985) 
c)  the  tight  money leading to the  inflation  reduction  was 
unprecedented in severity  and caused equally unprecedented  high 
real interest  rates,  (tlarida  and Friedman,  1983;  Blanchard  and 
Suamers, 1984). 
d)  the process by 4hich inflation was  cut -  the  switch of the Federal 
Reserve  from  interest  rate to money  supply  targets  - -  increased the 
volatility of nominsl interest  rates and thus raised  real rates  on 
securities  with borrower call or prepayment options,  such as long 
term fixed-rate  mortgages (1-tendershott  and Buser,  1984), 
a)  the deregulation  of thrift institutions  raised  rates on fixed-  rate 
mortgages relative to those  on Treasuries,  and 
f)  the cut in personal and corporate  msrginal tax rates and "tax 
reforms" raised  yields on tax-exempt  securities  relative to those 
on Treasuries. 
The  first  three hypotheses relate to interest  rates generally  and are best 
addressed  by examining  yields on noncallable  Treasury securities.  The 
second three  pertain to the relationship  between yields  on Treasury and 
other securities  and thus require analyses  of other  yields. 
Our investigation  is divided into three  parts dealing with Treasury 
securities (six-month  and ten-year  maturities), fixed-rate  mortgages,  and 
tax-exempt  securities (one and five  years).  In each part we begin by 
examining  how interest rates  (or interest  rate relationships)  have changed 
in the l980s  relative to the 1970s and then discuss the role of Reagan 
policies in these  changes.  The first two parts  draw heavily on Hendershott 
and Peek (1989) and Hendershott  and Van Order (1989).  We generally  find 3 
support for all the hypotheses  except those  relating  to the impact  of 
monetary and fiscal  policies  on real interest  rates.  These impacts have 
been overstated. 
I.  Treasury  Rates 
Expected Inflation,  Nominal Rates,  and Real Rates 
The top two series in Figure  1 are the yields  on six-month and ten-year 
Treasury securities,  both computed on a bond-equivalent  basis, for the 1970a 
and 1980s.  April and October values of the yields  are plotted.  The bottom 
two series  are expected inflation  races from the Livingston  and Hoey surveys 
on corresponding  dates; the latter  survey  did not begin until September 1978 
and was not collected  continuously  until the 1980s.2  The long rise in 
nominal rates up to 1981 is clear,  as is the decline since then  The rise 
and fall correspond  to a  rise and fall in expected inflation,  although the 
correspondence  is far from perfect.  The figure  suggests  about a one-for-one 
relationship  between interest  rates and expected inflation,  and empirical 
estimation  supports this  view. 
The term  structure  of interest ratea  appears to be related to the term 
structure of inflation  rates.  Twice the term structure  became inverted (the 
aix-month  rate exceeded the 10-year  rate), briefly in 1913-74  and for an 
extended period  between 1978  and 1981.  Both episodes  correspond to a sharp, 
but temporary  surge in inflation.  If the temporary  nature of this shock  was 
perceived, short-tern  expected inflation  would likely  exceed longer-term 4 
expected inflation.  We have a long-run  expected inflation rate for the 
second inversion  only:  Durirg  this inversion,  the short-term  expected 
inflation  rate did exceed the long-term  rate,  and when the short-term 
expected inflation  rate fell  below the long-term  rate,  the  inversion  ceased. 
Figure 2 plots the pretax real six-month  and 10-year  Treasury rates and 
the after-tax real six-month  rate.  The tax rate is a weighted average 
rarg6nsl. tax rate paid by households  on interest incoee.  To put these 
real rstos  in perspective,  we have plotted them for  the longer  1964-88 
period.  Here,  the high pretax  real rates  in the early l980s,  especially 
relative to the middle 1970s,  are obvious.  Thereel six-month  Treasury rate 
averaged 5.5 percent in the 1981-84  period,  a level  observed previously  only 
in the 1926-30  period, as opposed to 0.2 percent in the midl974-mid1978 
span.  Reel 10-year  Treasury rates appear  to have jumped similarly  in the 
early 1980s.  Furthermore,  reel short-  end long-term  Treasury rates  have 
been similar in magnitude in  the  1980s,  i.e.,  the long-term  premium  has not 
systematically  exceeded the short-term  premium. 
Also noteworthy  is the decline in reel interest  rates since 1984.  The 
reel  six-month  bill rate in the 1986-88 period  was slightly  gjpw its 
average in the previous quarter  century.  This little recognized  fact is 
particularly remarkable  because real activity  has been so strong in recent 
years and real bill rates  have historically  exhibited  a strong  procyclicsl 
pattern (Hendershott,  1986). 5 
Movements in the after-tax  real  bill rate are also interesting. 
According to this measure, the interest  rate puzzle  really  hasn't been the 
high rates in the 1980s  so much as the low rates in the l970s; the after-tax 
real rate never exceeded jms  one percent for the entire  1974-80 period. 
The early 1980s  values are quite comparable  to those observed throughout  the 
1960s, and more recent  values are roughly half those in the l9GOs.  In any 
event, explaining  the  jump in real interest  rates  in the l980s,  either 
before or after tax,  requires  starting  with why interest rates  were so low 
in the middle l970s  (Wilcox,  1983,  attributes  these low rates to the first 
OPEC shock) 
Reagan Policies and Real Rates 
How did fiscal  and monetary policy affect  the pattern of real rates  in 
the l980s?  Figure 3 contains the real interest  rate and two fiscal  policy 
variables;  the structural  federal deficit  as a fraction  of middle-expansion 
trend  ON? and the average  marginal tax rate used to measure after-tax real 
interest rates.4  The deficit  would appear  to be negatively correlated  with 
real rates in the l970s and early 1980s.  More specifically,  the structural 
deficit had hardly  begun to rise when the real  rate peaked in the l980s,  and 
the real rate  was back down to a normal level before the deficit reversed 
course.  While the deficit  might be badly  mismeasured, any reasonable 
measure must have risen  between 1981 and 1983, just when the real rate was 
declining.5  The tax rate series is positively  correlated  with the real 
rate during the 1977-88  period,  as we would expect (the  pretax rate rises in 6 
response to an increase in the tax rate in order to maintain the after-tax 
rate at a  given  level) 
Our  aultivariate analysis  (Henderahott and  Peek,  1989) auggeata a small 
positive irpact  (less than a  quarter percentage point)  of the  1980a 
structural  deficits  on yields.  However, the cut in marginal tax rates  has 
an even larger  negative impact.  Thus fiscal  policy,  broadly defined, tended 
to lower  Treasury rates,  not raise  them,  during  the Reagan years. 
Figure  4 plots the real aix-month  rate againat  our estimate of the 
impact  of monetary policy on the aix-month  rate.  (Monetary  policy is 
attributed to Reagan,  despite the Federal  Reaerve'a "independence,"  because 
of his strong  support of the Federal  Reserve.)  Our estimate is obtained by 
first  constructing  a proxy for monetary policy and then using this ptoxy as 
a regressor in an equation  explaining  bhe after-tax  bill rate.  We developed 
this proxy because customary  money measures are of doubtful  validity when 
effective  deposit rate ceilings  are changed and/or  new "money-like" 
financial  claims are introduced.  Our proxy is based on the behavior of the 
aix-month  bill rate,  which the Federal Reserve can control  over abort 
periods,  relative to that  of the five-year  Treasury bond rate,  over which 
the Federal Reserve has decidedly  less control.  More apecifically,  we 
explain the term structure  of interest  rates with the term structure  of 
expected inflation,  the business cycle,  and traditional  monetary polity 
variables and then attribute  the residual (plus  the traditional  monetary 
policy  variable's contribution)  to monetary policy. 7 
A  number of observations  follow  from Figure  4.  First,  the decline in 
the real rate from two and a half percent in late 1973 to negative one 
percent in early 1977 and the rebound to two and a half percent in 1980 are 
almost  fully accounted for by monetary policy.  Second,  while changes in 
monetary policy  explain both the  rebound in real rates to normal levels  in 
the  1978-SO  period and much of the decline Since  1984,  by our estimates 
monetary  policy doea not account  for the jump in real rates between 1978-80 
and 1981-84.  In summary,  monetary policy  was not noticeably  tighter in the 
early 1980s than in the 1973-74  period, although the period  of tightness, 
midl979 to mid1983, lasted  much longer.  As a result, the quarter-century 
upward trend  in inflation  was finally  broken,  Similarly,  the recent period 
of ease has been longer  than any in the last quarter-century  and has 
contributed  to the longest peace-time  expansion on  record. 
Our principal conclusion  is that the emphasis  on the high real interest 
rates  in the early l980s  has been overdone.  The key to understanding  real 
interest rates  in the last quarter century  is the extraordinarily  low 
interest rates  in much of the l97Os  owing to the two OPEC oil shocks,  which 
lowered investment  demand  and increased  world saving  by transferring  wealth 
from the high consuming  developed  countries  to  OPEC.  Figure  4 clearly 
indicates lower  real rates relative  to the contribution  of monetary  policy 
in the 1974-80 period than either  before or after.  Monetary policy  was 
tight for a long stretch in the early  l98Os,  but only tight enough  to cause 
real interest rates  to be about  a percentage  point and a  half above  normal. 
Fiscal  policy,  on the other  hand,  had little impact,  with decreasing marginal tax rates  more than offsetting  the intrease in structural  deficits. 
Finally,  some evidence  suggests that rthn  policy -- Reagan's  evil empire 
posture in  his  first  term -- contributed  marginally (about  a half percentage 
point) to the high real rates  by increasing  the feat  of nuclear var and thus 
reducing the private propensity  to save. 
II.  The Yield on Fixed-Rate  Mortgages 
Volatility and  Yields on Fixed-Rate  Mortgages 
A  fixed-rate  mortgage differs from  a Treasury security  vith equal 
duration because homeowners  tan tail or prepay  the mortgage while the 
Treasury cannot  prepay its debt.  For equal  coupon securities,  investors 
will prefer the Treasury; if market interest  rates  decline, investors in 
Treasuries  will continue to receive their  now above-market  coupons,  while 
investors in mortgages  will find their  funds  repaid end themselves forced  to 
invest in the now lower market  coupons.  To compensate  for the possibility 
of borrowers prepaying  when rates  decline,  investors  in fixed-rate  mortgagea 
must receive a higher coupon  than investors  in Treasuries,  the size of this 
coupon differential  depending  on the probability  that interest rates  will 
decline sufficiently  to trigger  prepayment.  This probability, in turn,  will 
be greater the more volatile are interest  rates  and the greater is the 
expectation  that interest  rates will decline. 
Figure 5 plots the ax post volatility  of interest  rates  and the spread 
between the conventional  new issue  mortgage  rate and the seven-year  Treasury 
rate (comparable  duration  Treasury).6  The spread  oscillated  between about one and two percentage  points in the 1970s  before the switch to a  more 
volatile interest-rate  monetary  policy in late 1979.  From this  point, the 
spread trended upward  until it peaked  at over three percentage  points in 
1981 and 1982.  After dipping  below two percentage  points in early 1984,  the 
spread again rose to nearly  three percentage  points in late 1986 before 
finally  declining to about two percentage  points. 
That increased interest  rate  volatility explains  some of the increase 
in the mortgage-Treasury  rate spread  is obvious from the figure.  Volatility 
jumped in late 1979,  just when the spread did,  and remained high through the 
peak of the spread in late 1982.  That is, much of the relative increase in 
the mortgage rate in 1981-82 simply  reflected  a more valuable prepayment  or 
call option.  However, more than  the rising  call value contributed  to the 
relatively  high mortgage rates  in the early l980s. 
The Savinas and Loans,  the Agencies and the Mortgage  Rate 
Figure  6 plots both the actual  conventional  mortgage coupon  rate and an 
estimate of what the rate should  have been given seven-year  Treasury  rates 
and the value of the homeowner's  call option (Hendershott  and  Van Order 
label  this  the  "perfect-market'  coupon  rate).  As can be seen,  the actual 
rate was about a half percentage  point too low during  most of the 1970s,  but 
then  was about a half point too high in the 1982-86  period,  giving  a total 
increase  of a full  percentage  point.  Since early 1987,  the actual  rate has 
been equal to the perfect market  rate. 
In the  l970s, mortgage lending was largely tied to the thrifts. 
Portfolio  restrictions  on savings and loans (no corporate loans, bonds, or 10 
equities) encouraged  their investment  in residential  mortgages, and these 
inveatmenta  ware especially  profitable  to rhrifts  owing to special tax 
advantages.  Thrifts that invested  a large  fraction of their assets in 
houaing-related  loans  cr liquid assets  could transfer  a large  fraction  of 
their  pretax income  ro loan loss reserves,  thereby avoiding taxes.  Between 
1962 and 1069,  this fraction  was 60 percent;  between 1969 and 1979,  the 
fraction  was gradoally  reduced to 40 percent: the Tax Reform  Act of 1966 
lowered  the fraction to 8 percent.  The inrentive  for mortgage investment 
provided by the extraordinary transfers  to loan loss reserves  was 
substsntial  in the 1960s  and 1970s;  savings and loans  would have accepted a 
half to three-quarters  of a percentage  point lower  pretax return  on tsx 
preferred  housing-related  assets than  on comparable  nonpreferred  assets. 
Thrifts  have shifted sharply out of fixed-rate  home mortgsges (FRMs) in 
the l980s.  Most strikingly,  the share of savings  and loan total  assets in 
home mortgages  and agency  securities (largely  Fannie  Mae and Freddie Mac 
pess-thtoughs)  fell from 72 to 57 percent during the 1982-87  period. 
Because ssvings  and loans  have aggressively  added adjustsble-rste  mortgages 
(ARMs)  to their  portfolios,  the shift  out of FRMs was far greater than 15 
percent of the portfolio,  These portfolio  shifts  were in response to the 
reduced profitsbility  of savings and loans  (first  due to high interest rates 
and a msturity mismatch  and then due to disinflation  and credit losses),  the 
expsnsion  of savings and loan asset powers,  and s regulatory-enhanced 
aversion to interesc-rste  risk.  The reduced  profitability  eroded the tsx 
incentive  for residential  mortgage investment,  while the expansion  of powers 11 
and regulatory  risk aversion encouraged  thrifts to invest  more widely (the 
latter also encouraged  switching from FRMs to ARMs).  The net result  was the 
mortgage rate rising from a half percentage  point below the perfect-market 
rate to a half point above. 
The half percentage  point premium in the early l980s provided the 
incentive  for the securitization  of conventional  FRMs by Fannie  Mae and 
Freddie  Mac,  The premium covered  both the start-up cost of the securitizers 
and the liquidity  premium demanded  by investors.  And securitize  Fannie and 
Freddie  did:  roughly half of newly-issued  conventional fixed-rate  mortgages 
originated in 1986 and 1987 were sold  directly to Fannie  and Freddie to be 
packaged into mortgage pools.  As the volume of mortgage pools grew,  bid/ask 
spreads  were bid down (and thus the liquidity  premium fell),  and the 
marginal costs of the  securitizers  declined.  As a result, the yields on 
conventional loans  have fallen  back in line  with capital market rates. 
Nonetheless, conventional  FP,M rates are still  about a half percentage 
point higher,  relative to Treasury  rates, than they  were in the 1970s. 
Attributing  this half point increase  to Reagan  policies seems  inappropriate, 
however.  The deterioration  of the  thrifts'  relative  position as profitable 
investors  can be traced to policy errors,  such as regulatory  prevention  of 
adjustable-rate  mortgages and the imposition  of deposit rate ceilings,  that 
date back to the l960s. 12 
III.  Yields on Tax Exempt Securities  ields 
Because investors  are interesred  in after-tax returns, rhe  tax-exempt 
status  of a security  will result  in its pretax  yield being bid down relative 
to pretax  yields on fully taxable  securities.  Tax-exempt  yields, then,  will 
only ha a fraction  of taxable  yields,  the fraction  being greater the less 
heavily taxed  are returns on taxable  aecurities.  The relationship  between 
default-free  yields on exempts (r)  and taxables (r)  will depend on the 
state of the economy aa well as tax rates.  A deteriorating  economy,  for 
example, could lead to greater  probability  of bankruptcy (larger  debt 
contracting  rosts)  and thus reduced issues  of fully tsxable  debt.  Also, the 
deterioration  could stimulate  a flight  to quality or greater demand for 
Treasury debt.  In both cases, fully  taxable retes would fall relative to 
tax-exempt  yields.  We thus express  the ratio of exempt to taxable rates as 
rex/rtx  (tctpiP) 
where to is the corporate tax rate,  t  is an index representing  the marginal 
personal tax rate schedule,  and p is a risk adjustment that  varies  with the 
state of the economy. 
Figure  7 plots the ratio of one-year  exempt to one-year taxable  yields 
(r/r), l-t, and a proxy for cyclical  swings in the economy (CAP).  The 
latter  is measured as 100 times  the difference  between middle-expansion 
trend  CE? and actual  ON?,  all divided  by trend  ON?.  The corporate  tax rate 13 
is not plotted because it varied so little  during this period.  The personal 
tax rate is the average marginal personal tax rate on interest income  earned 
(see  footnote  3).  The broad decrease  and then increase in l-t 
reflects 
both the bracket creep of the  1970s  and the l980s  Reagan tax cuts.  Figure 8 
plots the same ratio for five-year  securities.  Here the personal tax rate 
is a five-year  forward-looking  rate (the single  tax rate applied to all 
future cash flows that gives the same after-tax  rate of return as the stream 
of after-tax  payments based upon the average marginal personal tax rates 
that actually  evolved).  The general correlation  of the rate ratios  with the 
l-t's and CAP seems clear.7 
Closer inspection  of the figures  suggests two further points.  First. 
the cyclical impact  of GAP seems  to be limited to positive values; when GAP 
is negative in the 1972-73,  1978-80,  and 1986-88  periods, the rate ratios 
cease to follow  its movements.  This is consistent  with a risk adjustment 
that develops  when the economy falls  below trend but is fully eliminated 
when the economy gets back to trend.  Also,  the one-period  future,  rather 
than current,  value of CAP seems  to influence  the rate ratio.  Second,  both 
the one-year and five-year  race ratios  are  too high after  about 1984 
relative to the pattern existing  over the 1970-84  period.  More 
specifically,  the rate ratios are far closer to the 
1-tn's 
than they  were 
during comparable  periods  when the economy was above  trend (1972-73  and 
1978-80). An alternative  or additional  proxy for the risk adjustment  is the 
spread  between the six-month  commercial  paper and Treasury bill rates 
divided by the bill rate (PREM).8  As Euser and Hess (1986)  note,  the 
corporate-Treasury  yield spread  is a contemporaneous  proxy for expected 
bankruptcy.  This variable moves somewhat like  GAP, but falls far more 
abruptly in 1975 and rises  much less  in the 1980-82  period. 
utin thm  act of Rca aol  ic  ice 
We have estimated some simple  regression  equariens  for the 1970-84 
period and extrapolated them through  1988.  The equations  confirm both the 
importance  of our variables and the unusually  high rate ratios in the late 
1980e.  Representative  equations  are: 
One Year:  r  /r 
- .179  +  i.012(1-t  )  +  .0080 GAPE + .159  PREM  cx  tx  p 
(.107)  (0.155)  (.0022)  (.057) 
= .709,  SEE  .022, OW = 1.69 
Five Year:  r  /r  = - .111 + l.008(l-t  )  +  .0084 GAPZ + .093  PREM  cx  tx  p 
(.125)  (0.183)  (.0019)  (.050) 
= .724,  SEE = .019,  OW  1.32 
where GAPZ is zero  when 
GAP+I is negative  and equals  GAP+i 
otherwise and 
coefficient  standard errors  are in parentheses.  Note the similarity  of the 
tax rate and GAP coefficients in rhe two equations  and the closeness  of that 
on 1-t  to unity. 15 
Plots of the actual and fitted/forecasted  rate-ratio  values are 
presented in Figures  9 and 10.  The one-  and five-year  rate ratios  appear to 
be roughly 0.08 and 0,06 too high,  respectively,  in 1986-88.  That is, the 
tax-exempt  rates are roughly 50 basis points too high. 
The rise in  the rate ratios far above those  predicted in 1985-88 is 
likely due  to the anticipation  and enactment  of the 1986 Tax Reform  Act. 
The 1986 Act cut corporate tax rates from 0.46 to 0.34 (the impact  of the 
personal rate cut is already included  in the  forecasted  rate ratio), 
disallowed all bank interest expense allocable  to newly-acquired  tax-exempt 
bonds, enacted an alternative  minimum tax with tax-exempt  interest  included 
in the base, and substantially  restricted  future  issues  of business 
industrial  revenue  and household  mortgage revenue  bonds (since  the end of 
1985,  the quantity  of these  bonds outstanding  has declined  by 10 percent). 
The rate cut,  the disallowance  of bank interest  expense, and the alternative 
minimum tax should all reduce  commercial  bank demand  for tax-exempts  (Neubig 
and Sullivan,  1987).  In  fact,  commercial  bank holdings of tax-exempts  have 
declined from $231  billion at the end of 1985 to $152  billion at the end of 
1988.  The increase in the rate ratios  in 1985 reflected a surge in tax- 
exempt  issues in anticipation  of the Tax Act.  Tax-exempt  debt outstanding 
rose  by $139 billion in 1985 ($98 billion in the fourth  quarter alone) 
versus $5l-54  billion in 1983 and l984. 16 
What do we conclude about the  impact  of Reagan policies  on tax-exempt 
yields?  In effect,  we can attribute  all of the 0.1? increase in the rate- 
tatios aince 1980 to Reagan  polities, first the 1981 rate cuts and later the 
1986 Act.  At a ?,5 peccent taxable  rate,  this amounts to a one and a 
quarter percentage  point increase in tax-exempt  yields.  Of course, if the 
Reagan tax outs themselves  lowered taxable  rates  by nearly a percentage 
point aa we are prepared to argue,  then the net increase  in tax-exempt 
yialds ia only about three-quarters  of a percentage  point. 
IV.  Suimsary 
During the first Reagan  term,  the battle to lower inflation  acted to 
maintain the high real interest  rates  carried over from the Carter  years 
and, while rhe increase  in structural  deficits did not raise  real rates 
much, an aggressive foreign  policy increased  them  by half a percentage  point 
by heightening  nuclear fear and thus reducing  private  saving.  These 
factors,  strongly  reinforced  by the unwinding  of the second  OPEC shook, 
raised  real interest  rstes  to levels  not seen since the late 1920s. 
Moreover, the increased  volatility  of interest rates  during this  protracted 
battle with inflation  raised  yields  on callable fixed-rate  mortgages by over 
a percentage  point relative to the already inflated  yields on nonosllsble 
Treasuries. 
By the end of Resgsn's second  term,  inflation,  marginal tax rates, 
nuclear fear,  and interest  rate volatility  were all down.  As a result, 
nominal Treasury rates  have plunged, and yields on csllsble  securities  such 17 
as fixed-rate  mortgages  have receded to more normal levels  relative to 
noncallable  Treasuries.  Real Treasury rates  sInce 1986 are below theIr 
average values for the previous quarter century.  Yields on tax-exempt 
securities  are one and a quarter  percentage points  higher relative to 
Treasuries than in the pre-Reagan  years, and yields  on fixed-rate  mortgages 
are up by a half percentage  point.  These constitute  an intended reduction 
in the previous financial  subsidies to state  and local  and household capital 
formation,  respectively. 18 
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Footnotes 
1,  While the  period of tight money began well before Reagan took 
office,  his support of that  policy allowed it to continue until 
inflation  was substantially reduced.  Numerous previous 
administrations  had  begun attacks  on inflation,  but all had 
backed off before inflation  was permanently  lowered. 
2.  The interest rate  series are  the April and October monthly 
averages of daily secondary  market six-month  Treasury bill rates 
(converted  from a discount basis to a  bond-equivalent  yield) and 
the ten-year constant maturity Treasury bond yield,  both from the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin.  The April and October observations 
were selected to correspond  with the approximate  date  at which 
respondents to the semiannual  Livingston survey form their 
expectations.  The six-month  Livingston  expected inflation  rate 
series was provided by the Federal  Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
The ten-year expected inflation  rate  series is from the Decision- 
Makers Survey conducted by  Richard B.  Hoey at Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, Inc.  This series is not available for every April and 
October; when necessary, it has been interpolated  from the data 
for nearby months. 21 
3.  The ex ante  six-month  pretax real interest rate  is 
calculated as the six-month  Treasury bill rate less  the six-month 
Livingston expected inflation  series.  The cx  ante  ten-year 
pretax real  rate  is from  the Decision Makers Survey.  Missing 
April and October  observations  have been  interpolated  from the 
data for nearby months.  The  after-tax real  rate  is  calculated as 
the after-tax  nominal rate  less  expected inflation,  The tax rate 
on interest income is an average marginal tax rate constructed 
from data  contained in annual  editions of Statistics  of Income, 
Individual Income  Tax Returns  as  a weighted average  of the 
statutory marginal personal income  tax rate for each adjusted 
gross income  class.  The weight for each class  is equal to its 
share of the  total  interest received by all income  classes. 
4.  Both the real interest rate  and the  tax  rate were described 
in footnote 3.  The deficit  measure is the cyclically-adjusted 
federal budget deficit as a percerLtage of middle-expansion trend 
GNP and is based on the series constructed by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  Our measure is an average of this  series for 
the quarter beginning in April (or October) and the subsequent 
quarter to correspond to the  time  span covered  by the six-month 
Treasury bill rate. 22 
5.  An inflation-adjusted  measure of the deficit would exhibit an 
even sharper increase  between 1981  and 1983 because the inflation 
rate was falling.  However,  any particular deficit measure will 
suffer from a number of problems.  On general  measurement issues, 
see,  for  example,  Eisner (1989) and  Kotlikoff (1986). 
6.  The seven-year  Treasury rate is the constant maturity series 
from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.  The mortgage rate and  the 
volatility measure are both based on data from  Flendershott and 
Van  Order (1989).  The mortgage rate is the conventional 
commitment mortgage coupon rate adjusted for points,  where that 
adjustment is equal to (Points-1)/(4.2  + .106  slope 
-  .69  vol), 
where slope is the difference  between the seven-year  and six- 
month Treasury rates and volatility (vol)  is one-half the 
cumulative absolute change in the seven-year  Treasury rate over 
the previous 20 weeks.  We plot semiannual averages of weekly 
data. 
7.  The five-year  rate ratio exceeds the one-year ratio by about 
0.05 on average.  This could reflect the value of the tax-trading 
option (let capital gains  run but  take capital losses)  of the 
longer term securities (Rendershott,  1985,  pp. 158-60). 23 
7.  The commercial paper rate  is for  firms  with bond ratings of 
Aa or equivalent, from the Federal  Reserve Bulletin. 
8.  Part of the  1985  surge was matched by an increase in 
commercial hank demand  an increase  of $57 billion in 1985 ($4C 
billion in the fourth quarter)  versus $11 billion in 1984  -  -  as 
banks  stocked  up  in anticipation  of the 1986 Act. t
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